Glenwood in the Civil War

A Big Day at Bloomsburg

Imagine:

It’s mid afternoon, June 28th, 1863.

The Nation has entered the third year of its devastating Civil War and Robert E. Lee’s Confederate Army is in Pennsylvania.

You are sitting on the porch of James B. Matthew’s home of 33 years on a Maryland hillside overlooking beautiful farm land and a dirt road, 30 miles due north of Washington DC. You hear wagons coming up the road. You can’t miss the noise and dust of 125 Federal supply wagons!

BUT SOMETHING IS TERRIBLY WRONG!

These supply wagons are being led by Jeb Stuart’s Confederate Cavalry! And, they are heading for Gettysburg!

Today YOU can still sit on that same porch and look out over the unchanged farm land.

And if you do, you may drift back in time to see dust clouds making it hard to breathe and reverberations from the passing wagons causing the furniture to shake! Those wagons, filled with badly needed supplies, were captured that morning on their way to the Battle of Gettysburg.

Those wagons caused Stuart to arrive late on the second day of the three day battle. For this Stuart received the harshest rebuke ever given by General Robert E. Lee:

“Where have you been?”

Bloomsburg and the Civil War

General J.E.B Stuart’s cavalry ride behind enemy lines through Maryland from June 28 to July 2, 1863, ranks high among the major controversies of the American Civil War. Had he not captured those wagons at Rockville on June 28th, he could have reached General Lee’s troops prior to the beginning of the Battle of Gettysburg rather than at the end of the 2nd day of the 3 day battle. Had Stuart been with Lee for the entire battle, its outcome and that of the entire Civil War might have been very different.

Before sunrise on June 28, with the blessing of General Robert E. Lee, General Stuart and his cavalry crossed the Potomac River into Maryland and proceeded to the small town of Rockville. Stuart’s plan had been to proceed quickly north through central Maryland, gathering intelligence on Federal troop movements, and then to link up with Lee’s forces in Pennsylvania.

As Stuart approached Rockville, he realized he had an opportunity to capture 125 Federal supply wagons. Stuart chose to capture the wagons instead of proceeding quickly to join Lee. As a result, he was late, and General Lee was deprived of the intelligence that Stuart’s Cavalry could have given him had they been together.

Had Stuart proceeded quickly north without the wagons, he likely would have met with Lee prior to the first day of the Battle (July 1st) and the outcome of that Battle and perhaps the Civil War itself might have been very different.

History has recorded that Stuart’s forces, with their train of wagons, slowly passed Bloomsburg, the home of James B. Matthews, in the late afternoon of June 28, 1863, in what was then Matthews, Maryland.

Locals sitting on Matthew’s front porch would have either waved happily to the Confederate troops or fled in fright, depending upon which side of the War they supported.

Recommended Historical Resources

For historical references, I recommend:

“I Rode With JEB Stuart; The Life and Campaigns of Major General J.E.B Stuart” by H. B. McClellan, written between 1880 and 1885, and published by the Civil War Centennial Series, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana. Pages 325 - 337.
“JEB Stuart” by John W. Thompson, Jr., Captain, U.S. Marine Corps; Published in 1994 by Smithmark Publishers Inc., 16 East 32nd Street, New York, NY 10016.
Pages 429 - 440.
“Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, His Military and Personal History” by A. L. Long, Copyright 1983 by the Blue and Grey Press, Secaucus, N. J., pages 272 thru 282.
Or just Google “JEB Stuart Gettysburg”

From "I Rode With JEB Stuart"

Page 325:
“We read the history of the minutest events connected with this campaign in the light of the final result. Had General Lee gained the battle of Gettysburg, as he said he would have if Stonewall Jackson had been present, the persistency with which Stuart held on to these wagons, and the difficulties he surmounted in transporting them safely through an enemy’s country during the next three days and nights of incessant marching and fighting, would have been the cause of congratulation.

But Gettysburg was lost to the Confederate arms, and not through Stuart’s fault; and every circumstance which might have contributed to a different result will be judged in the light of the final catastrophe.

Considered from this point of view, it must be acknowledged that the capture of this train of wagons was a misfortune. The time occupied in securing it was insignificant; but the delay caused to the subsequent march was serious at the time when minutes counted almost as hours. Had Stuart been entirely unimpeded he would have probably passed Hanover, PA., on June 30th, before the arrival of (U.S.) Kilpatrick’s division, and would have been in communication with General Lee before nightfall on that day.

That this would have altered the result of the campaign is a matter of grave doubt; but it would certainly have relieved the movement of the cavalry around the rear of (U.S. General) Meade’s army of the disapprobation to which some have given expression.

Another cause of delay at Rockville was Stuart’s humanity towards his prisoners, of whom more than four hundred were in his hands. … Stuart consented to a parole, and the whole of the night (June 28th) was consumed at Brooksville, Maryland, and much time the next morning at Cooksville in accomplishing this business, - a useless task; for the Federal authorities refused to acknowledge the parole, and returned the officers and men immediately to duty.”

Another cause of delay at Rockville was Stuart’s humanity towards his prisoners, of whom more than four hundred were in his hands. …Stuart consented to a parole, and the whole of the night was consumed at Brookville and much time the next morning at Cooksville in accomplishing this business, - a useless task; for the Federal authorities refused to acknowledge the parole, and returned the officers and men immediately to duty.

While this parole was being transacted, Fitz Lee’s brigade was moved northward towards the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (3 miles north of Cooksville), which it reached soon after daylight on the morning of June 29th. Much time was necessaritly consumed in tearing up the track at Hood’s Mill, in burning the bridge at Sykesville, and destroying the telegraph line; but this work was effectually accomplished, and the last means of communication between General Meade’s army and Washington was destroyed.

Stuart pressed on to Westminster, which he reached about five o’clock on June 29th. Here his advance encountered a brief but stubborn resistance from the 1st Delaware Cavalry. Sturart move on to Union Mills on the Gettysburg road where he rested for the night.

Today, we can see that it would have been better had Stuart here destroyed the captured wagons. … Now the close proximity of the enemy suggested the probability of a collision on June 30th. … But it was not in Stuart’s nature to abandon an attempt until it had been proven to be beyond his powers; and he determined to hold on to his prize until the last moment. This was unfortunate.

[After a series of skirmishes around Hanover, PA …] during the night march to Jefferson, the wagons and prisoners were a serious hindrance. Nearly four hundred prisoners had accumulated since the parole at Cooksville. Many were loaded in wagons, some acted as drivers. Not infrequently the train would halt because a driver had fallen asleep. When they reached the road from York to Gettysburg, on the morning of July 1st, Stuart pressed on toward Carlisle (away from Gettysburg). While at Carlisle, Stuart received orders from General Lee to move at once for Gettysburg. Stuart reached Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 2nd and took position on the Confederate left. For eight days and nights this troops had been marching incessantly.
This movement of Stuart in the rear of the Federal army has been the subject of much discussion and the prevalent opinion among writers, both Federal and Confederate, is that it was an error in strategy.

From “Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, His Military and Personal History”

Page 272:
“ Stuart, instead of maintaining his appropriate position between the armies, placed himself on the right flank of the enemy, where his communication with Lee was effectually severed. This greatly embarrassed the movements of General Lee, and eventually forced him to an engagement under disadvantageous circumstances.

Page 275:
On July 1st, “The unfortunate absence of the cavalry prevented (Lee) from knowing the position and movements of the enemy and it was impossible to estimate the movements of the enemy. General Lee now exhibited a degree of anxiety and impatience, and expressed regret at the absence of the cavalry.”

Page 277:
“ This battle was precipitated by the absence of information which could only be obtained by an active cavalry force.”

Page 280:
“As we have said so much in regard to the absence of the cavalry and the difficulties thence arising, it is proper at this point to explain its cause. Stuart’s passage of the Potomac at a point eastward of that where the Federal crossing was made was intended, as has been said, as a feint, with the view of creating a diversion in favor of General Lee by arousing fears of danger to Washington, to the vicinity of which city the cavalry advanced. However, the movement proved a highly unfortunate one, and was followed by irretrievable disaster; for Stuart had no sooner entered Maryland than his return was barred by the intrusion of a large Federal force between him and the river, and he was obliged to make a wide circuit through Maryland and Pennsylvania before he could resume his proper place with the army. This occupied him seven or eight days, and it was the 2d of July before he rejoined the army at Gettysburg in a very reduced condition, for many of his men had been dismounted, and the horses of those who remained in the saddle were much jaded by long and rapid marches.